On the Word Boundary

A note on why the word matters.

Most theories of how societies should be organized are named for what they pursue: justice, equality, liberty, welfare. Boundaryism is named for what must not be crossed.

This is not a stylistic choice. It reflects the structure of the theory itself. To name a theory for what it pursues is to orient it toward an ideal — toward a destination that may always recede, that can always be deferred, that can absorb any amount of present harm in the name of future arrival.

To name a theory for the boundary is to orient it toward the present. A boundary is not a destination. It is a line that either holds or does not hold, here, now, in this arrangement, for these people. The question is not whether we are approaching the ideal. The question is whether we have crossed the line beyond which justification has failed.

A boundary is also, unlike an ideal, something one can be on the wrong side of without knowing it. Much of the work ahead is the work of detection: learning to see where a boundary has already been crossed, quietly, in arrangements that appear orderly and continue to function. The fact that a structure still operates is not evidence that its boundaries hold.